In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Don't Mute the MessengerNilsa RicciAs a Spanish interpreter, I spend a lot of time talking with patients, family members, and other care team members. Like how an actor reciting from never-before-seen cue cards is talking or how a medium in a trance during a séance is talking. I talk without my voice. This leaves a lot left unsaid.I am also a resident, and I communicate with patients, family members, (...) and other care team members in my own words. Working as both a Spanish interpreter and resident has given me a unique perspective, particularly about the boundaries I am able to set with patients. Both Spanish interpreters and medical providers are expected to maintain a professional distance with patients, which can [End Page 171] provide a certain level of emotional protection. However, the nature of interpreting compromises this distance and protection.In first person I must speak,Which makes my position unique.I was taught to interpret everything in the first person. For example, instead of saying, "The patient's mother is asking if her baby is dead …?" I ask, "Is my baby dead?!" The intent is to facilitate direct communication between patients and providers so they can build rapport. Unnoticed is that I hear a patient's traumatic experience, process it, and then deliver those vivid details in the first person of another language. My sense of self is breached because the first person is no longer innately reserved for my own self. The topic does not even have to be traumatic in the typical sense for it to cause harm. Speaking in the first person erodes the boundaries between self and non-self, exposing me to emotional trauma.One day, I was paged to an intensive care unit to interpret for a doctor and mother in front of an unconscious person on a ventilator. I had to play the role of a doctor who desperately wants to convince a mother that her son has no chance of survival—I must directly challenge any hope for a miracle to spare her a long road of heartbreak and disappointment. I also had to play the role of a mother who strongly questions science—I know faith is essential to my son's recovery, and I will wait for a miracle.In breaking bad news, there is that heavy moment when hopeful eyes beg for anything other than the painful message about to be delivered. The words may not be mine in origin, but the reaction is always to my interpretation. I watch the light of hope dull into despair and observe life leave the mother's essence.Boundaries blur as I play each part:I lend my voice but sacrifice my heart.Suddenly, I am wearing the mother's shoes and we experience grief's abyss together. I am made to recount memories I had with my son and made to long for the ones we will never form. Tears obscure my vision, and I feel my heart break as I realize my son is dead. My world crumbles and my vocal cords quiver then halt. I know the next sound will be incomprehensible. Wailing, the mother's voice is only intermittently understandable. In Spanish, she exclaims, "How many years must I live without you?" The doctor looks at me, inquisitive of my new silence.False memories flood my brainAs if possessed by pain.I hear myself say, "I can't understand her exactly," and then summarize her words in the third person. Instantly, I feel some relief. But with the relief comes shame for showing my weakness—for needing to break the protocol to cling to my sense of self. My pager suddenly beeps, breaking through the confusion like an alarm clock interrupting a nightmare. In a daze, I remember I am the interpreter—not this doctor, not this mother. I do not have a patient with complete loss of brain function. I do not have a son to bury. The doctor says, "Let's give her some privacy," and we excuse ourselves from her grief.Why then are your shadows still in sightEven now that my own script I write... (shrink)

Ruben Berrios Queen’s University Belfast Anti-realism and Aesthetic Cognition Abstract At the core of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is the question of the relation between scientific theory and the world. The realist possesses a mimetic conception of the relation between theory and reality. For the realist, scientific theories represent reality. The anti-realist, in contrast, seeks to understand the relations between theory and world in non-mimetic terms. We will examine Cartwright’s simulacrum account of explanation in order to (...) illuminate the anti-realist position. Science consists of phenomenological and theoretical laws. The former are concerned with appearances, or those phenomena that can be directly observed; the latter involve the unobservable reality that is alleged to underlie appearances, and are capable only of indirect confirmation. Phenomenological laws are said to be descriptive, whilst theoretical laws are understood as explanatory. Cartwright is concerned with the theoretical. She claims that the standard realist account of the explanatory efficacy of theoretical laws is faulty. The explanatory power of theoretical laws consists in their ability to provide an explanation of physical phenomena. According to Cartwright, the realist claims that laws explain phenomena by providing an abstract description of them, in terms of their micro-structural features, that is alleged to be true. On this view, explanatory power is entirely dependent on descriptive adequacy. As phenomenological laws describe appearances, so theoretical laws describe the fundamental reality that governs appearances. Cartwright rejects the preceding view and in its place proposes a simulacrum account of explanation. According to Cartwright, the explanatory power of theoretical laws is related not to descriptive adequacy, but rather to the construction of adequate models. To explain a phenomenon is to construct a model which best or most adequately accommodates the phenomenon to a theory. The model will consist of various posited objects that serve to explain the phenomena in terms that are consistent with a set of theoretical laws. Cartwright claims that theoretical laws are true of, or describe, the objects of the model. The objects of the model, however, are not descriptive of reality. They are simulacra. They have, that is, the form or appearance of things, without possessing their substance or proper qualities. In light of the foregoing account we can summarise the distinction between scientific realism and anti-realism as follows. The realist claims that theoretical laws literally represent real objects. The anti-realist claims that laws represent objects of a model that are simulacra of reality. Anti-realism has an aesthetic dimension. The movement from realism to anti-realism is also the movement from the mimetic conception of the scientist as holding a mirror to nature to the constructionist view of the scientist as engaging with nature through invention. There is a lot of the artist in the anti-realist’s view of the scientist. This is true for Cartwright as well as, for example, Van Fraassen in his doctrine of constructive empiricism. It would appear, then, that the philosophy of science has absorbed some concepts that are ordinarily housed in aesthetics. And it has done so profitably. The aim of this paper is to reverse the direction of disciplinary influence. Can art, in relation to its status as a cognitive enterprise, be illuminated by scientific anti-realism? I will argue that it can. In an unexpected reference to the Nicomachean Ethics, Cartwright draws a suggestive parallel between theoretical laws and general moral principles, on the one hand, and physical phenomena and everyday moral conduct, on the other hand. If we add to this the claim that a central component of art’s value is cognitive, then we have the basic materials with which to flesh out a broadly anti-realist view of art. In the production of art, artists can construct models that mediate between everyday ethical phenomena and general ethical tendencies. These models reveal the ways in which there are implicit consistencies or inconsistencies, conflicts or congruences and so forth, between the phenomena and the tendencies. On this basis art can contribute to the reflective understanding of ethical life. This constitutes to a large degree art’s status as a cognitive enterprise. To apprehend art cognitively as artist or critic is to engage in aesthetic cognition. (shrink)

Sección I. Aportes desde las epistemologías feministas -- Sección II. Posturas éticas en las antropologías feministas -- Sección III. Protagonistas diversas, voces multisituadas -- Sección IV. La antropología y el feminismo: narraciones en primera persona sobre experiencias de investigación y docencia -- Sección V. Expresiones contemporáneas de la violencia.

This article aims to make a philosophical interpretation of the phenomenon of stress based on Heidegger’s thought. Firstly, I present a general review of the scientific concept of stress as well as the main theories about it. Secondly, the concept of stress in Heidegger’s thought is analyzed and I propose to understand it as a load or requests that are directed to the Dasein in its openness to the entities of the world. Finally, this shows that the approach to the (...) phenomenon of stress from Heidegger’s phenomenological-existential perspective allows us to overcome the causal and physiological explanations that do not consider stress as a fundamental way of being typical of human beings in so far as they are a Dasein. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Full Collection of Personal NarrativesGianna O'Leary, Paul Hostovsky, Yilu Ma, Leo Almazan, Hilda Sanchez-Herrera, Marisa Rueda Will, Elaine Hsieh, Manuel Patiño, Felicity Ratway, Liliana Crane, Laisson DeSouza, Nilsa Ricci, Linda Pollack-Jackson, Kelley Cooper, Mateo Rutherford-Rojas, Rosa C. Moreno, Maja Milkowska-Shibata, Patricia Coronado, and Catalina Meyer• A Day in the Life of a Spanish Interpreter• Deaf Interpreter• "Call me Dr. XXX!"• Translating Care for the Voiceless Patient• Are We (...) There Yet? A Narrative of Firsthand Interpreter Experiences in the Medical Field and Insights to Aid Language Access Compliance• One Interpreter's Journey of Interpreting for Pregnancy Loss• More Than Words: Communicating for the Quality of Care• From Linguistic Bridge Builder to Aspiring Physician• Towards Language Justice: A Call to Identify and Overcome Structural Barriers• Voices in the Shadows: The Hidden Complexities of Being a Medical Interpreter• The Voice of Patients: The Exclusive Work of a Human Who Can Advocate• Don't Mute the Messenger• The Ramp and the Stop Sign• How Policies and Practices in Medical Settings Impact Communication Access with Deaf Patients and Caregivers• And When May I Cry? Juggling Emotions in Healthcare Interpreting• To Engage or Not to Engage: An Interpreter and a Mother's Need for Connection in the Cardiothoracic Unit• Witnessing Trauma: Emotional Challenges in Medical Interpretation• Being an Interpreter—Beyond Linguistics• 1-800-Quit-NowCopyright © 2024 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.3 (2002) 287-288 [Access article in PDF] Investigating Depersonalization Filip Radovic and Susanna Radovic The comments offered by Morris and Modigh in this issue give us an opportunity to clarify some of the views and topics discussed in our paper.One of Morris' objections is that we on some occasions characterize depersonalization complaints in a way that indicate delusion. Although one of the criteria of depersonalization (...) syndrome is intact reality testing (APA 2000), it is nevertheless the case that patients with depersonalization complaints may at the same time be delusional, a fact that Modigh also points out: "The border between unreality feelings with largely intact reality-testing ability and psychotic disorders with grossly disturbed reality-testing is, however, not absolute and patients with psychotic disorders may of course experience feelings of unreality or depersonalization."Morris is also critical of the idea that feelings of unreality in the quasi-sensory sense (or in sense [a3]) may tempt patients to doubt the reality of the items experienced as unreal. We suggest that the experience of the self or the world as unreal may actually give rise to an impulse to believe that the self or the world does not exist. This, however, need not imply that a person who has such a belief is delusional. For example, consider the following cases, which include patients with intense unreality feelings but who exhibit largely intact reality testing. One of Sierra and Berrios' (2000) patients says: "I have to touch myself to make sure that I have a body and a real existence." Lindqvist (1966, p. 171) describes two cases of the "mirror syndrome," which he recognizes as a typical behavior seen in cases of severe depersonalization. The patients want to confirm that they are real by looking in a mirror. Such cases strongly indicate that a person with otherwise intact reality testing can be so overwhelmed by feelings of unreality that he or she can come to doubt his or her own existence. The reason we do not want to call this state delusional is that the patient constantly tries to compare the experience of reality with some other mark of reality (e.g., by using a mirror), thus indicating that, on a higher cognitive level, he or she still understands that his or her belief may be incorrect. The image in the mirror works as an assurance that the fear of not existing is, after all, just a fear.Merleau-Ponty's (1962) description of Stratton's inverting spectacles experiment is indeed relevant to our analysis. The experiment seems to indicate that the feeling of unreality corresponds to the degree of unfamiliarity with seeing the world upside down. Stratton's subjects report that after a couple of days objects still appear inverted but less unreal than they did before. This seems to suggest that unreal in this circumstance approximates not normal. An inverted world is after some time accepted as normal. (See also note 3 in our paper.)Let us conclude with a few comments on an important methodological issue. Our methodological [End Page 287] approach is not equivalent with a classical ordinary language approach because our main concern is language use in psychiatric contexts. A classical ordinary language analysis aims to explicate how terms actually are used in everyday language; our primary concern is to try to understand the phenomenology underlying descriptions of felt unreality given by patients suffering from depersonalization. However, we do start by looking at the terms from an everyday angle, but this only gives us a coarse approximation of what the depersonalization patient may mean by such expressions. The strange and unpleasant phenomenology of the condition in combination with the variety of characteristic expressions make it likely that the role of unreal in connection with depersonalization complaints is quite different from its use in everyday language. When a person undergoes a depersonalization episode for the first time, he or she encounters a quite new and perhaps unexpected phenomenological reality. When the person attempts to describe these perplexing feelings he or she, naturally, uses terms found in everyday language, but the changed... (shrink)

Niektórzy filozofowie twierdzą, że można kogoś skrzywdzić albo wyświadczyć mu dobrodziejstwo, powołując go do istnienia. Twierdzenie to opiera się na założeniu, że możliwe jest porównanie aktualnego poziomu dobrostanu osoby z poziomem dobrostanu, jaki osoba ta miałaby, gdyby nigdy nie zaistniała. Celem tej pracy jest zbadanie, czy możliwe jest dokonanie takiej porównawczej oceny w sensowny, logiczny i metafizycznie niewadliwy sposób. Analizuję argumenty sformułowane przez Nilsa Holtuga i Melindę Roberts na rzecz tezy, że istnienie może być gorsze albo lepsze dla osoby (...) od nieistnienia. Zaczynam od przedyskutowania Holtugowskiej obrony, która odwołuje się do trzech klasycznych teorii dobrostanu: teorii stanów mentalnych, teorii preferencji oraz teorii listy obiektywnej. Formuję zarzuty przeciwko jego argumentacji, w tym „zarzut braku odniesienia”, „zarzut braku podmiotu wartości”, „zarzut nieporównywalności”, „zarzut zrównania bezwartościowości z wartością zerową” oraz „zarzut naruszenia logiki relacji”. Z analiz tych wyciągam wniosek, że nie można twierdzić, że ktoś ma się gorzej albo lepiej niż miałby się, gdyby nie został powołany do istnienia. Na koniec, krótko omawiam argumentację Holtuga odwołującą się do teorii preferencji w ujęciu obiektu preferencji. Sugeruję, że również ten sposób obrony tezy, że istnienie może być gorsze albo lepsze dla osoby od nieistnienia, nie jest przekonujący, ponieważ teoria preferencji w ujęciu obiektu preferencji nie jest dobrym kandydatem na teorię dobrostanu. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the Ganser syndrome and gives a brief account on its clinical features. A significant number of clinicians in Europe continued accepting Ganser's basic postulates that the patients showed significant memory disorder and 'answers towards the question' within the framework of traumatic or reactive hysteria. In elderly patients, Ganser type symptoms may be indicative of the onset of dementia. Ganser syndrome raises the question of the interaction between concepts, ideology and clinical observation. The clinician must be aware that (...) a misdiagnosed case of Ganser-type hysteria may result in lawsuits, unnecessary surgical interventions, inappropriate use of minor and major tranquillizers, and social consequences that may be destabilizing for the patient and family. Positive results in the organic investigation should lead to a firm diagnosis and disconfirmation of Ganser syndrome. Persistent negative results and dramatic improvement should tend to confirm the diagnosis. (shrink)

Ghazzālī, 1058-1111; Kīmiyā-yi saʻādat -Criticism and interpretation ; Ghazzālī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, -1126; Savāniḥ -Criticism and interpretation ; Ghazzālī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, -1126; Baḥr al-muḥabbat fī asrār al-muvaddat fītafsīr Sūrah-i Yūsuf -Criticism.

Salafism is one of the most important issues of the last few centuries. There are intense discussions on the issues related to Salafism, its emergence, how it was first used by whom and in what sense. Discussions about Salafism are sometimes experienced in relation to whether this concept corresponds to a mentality or to a sect, and sometimes this phenomenon is brought up in relation to a number of important names that have taken place in the history of Islamic thought. (...) Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) emerges as the most frequently mentioned name in this context. Therefore, in this article, we have examined how Salafism/Salafiyya concept is used in the works of Ibn Taymiyya who is accepted as the theorist and the most powerful representative of Salafism. We have discussed the issue in a comprehensive manner by including the concept of Salaf, which is one of the most used concepts of Ibn Taymiyya. When we consider Ibn Taymiyya's use of the concepts of Salaf and Salafiyya, the concept of Salaf is seen to be used much more than the concept of Salafiyya. Thus, the concept of Salaf in the thought of Ibn Taymiyya refers to the Islamic society that lived in the early centuries and the conception of religion revealed by this society. The concept of Salafiyya, however, appears to have been used in a way that reflects a mentality and a way of thinking rather than a particular school or sect.Summary: Sects are human made structures that emerged with the institutionalization of differentiations in the conception of religion. The production of systematic theology and fiqh, the formation of its own literature, its dissemination and dissociation from other systems of thought are the most important turning points for the emergence of sects. One of the most important variables that determine the formation process of sects is the mentality of sect. It is known that the sects come into the realm of existence when the mindsets with the implicit reference system become visible. Therefore, there is a mentality on which every sect is based, but not every mentality has come to the point of being a sect. While some mentalities have influenced different sects in different shades, some of them have been confronted with only one sect.In fact, Salafism is one of the ways of thinking which is a mindset and it is a subject of important debates about whether it is a sect. Although the use of salafiyya is seen in the literature in the past, the fact that Salafism felt its existence as a kind of religion or mentality was realized in the 18th and 19th centuries. It is also known that the discussions about the definition of Salafism have started since these periods. From the second half of the 20th century, Salafism began to take a place in the agenda of both the Islamic world and the West. This has naturally led to efforts to define Salafism. Thus, Salafism is subjected to attempts to identify and associate with structures, such as denomination, ideology, religious understanding and mentality. In this direction, it is seen that Salafism is tried to be defined by establishing close link with the structures, such as Ahl al-Sunnah, Ahl-i Hadith, Hanbalism and Wahhabism or by reducing them directly to one of these structures. Thus, Salafism is sometimes backed up to the early stages of Islamic thought and sometimes associated with multilayered structures, such as the Ahl al-Sunnah, which embodies many political-mythic and fiqh structures.In line with the efforts of defining Salafism, it is also seen that many names that have had a say in classical Islamic thought or have been mentioned in modern times have been brought to the agenda. In addition to the names, such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the names of Emir al-Saneyani, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad al-Shawkani, Shaykh Abdulaziz ibn Baz and Muhammad Nasir al-din al-Albani are frequently mentioned in this process. It should be noted that there is a special place of Ibn Taymiyya among these names. Ibn Taymiyya took the place of both in history of Islamic thought and Ahl al-Hadith-Hanbalite tradition and made a name for himself in the context of many subjects. It is claimed that Ibn Taymiyya, who was the theorist of the Hanbalite conception of religion, and the missionary of the New Hanbalism, was also the founding figure and the most important representative of Salafism. In modern times, most of those who declare ideas about Salafism place Ibn Taymiyya at the center of Salafism and present him as the founding name of this mentality. However, the question of what kind of relationship between the mentality called Salafism and Ibn Taymiyya's world of thought and religion is not the subject of academic studies. However, the works of Ibn Taymiyya, who is an author of a very velocity, should be analyzed from this point of view and all kinds of words about Ibn Taymiyya-Salafism relationship should be left behind this effort. Our study, which aims to fulfill this gap, was designed to explain topics, such as whether the concept of salafiyya was used in the works of Ibn Taymiyya, whether and how the past was used, and the extent to which the meaning attributed to the salafiyya coincided with the current Salafism. Understanding of the concept of the salafiyya in the works of Ibn Taymiyya depends on the explanation of how the term salaf was derived and used by Ibn Taymiyya. When the works of Ibn Taymiyya are scanned, it is seen that he used the word salaf much more than the word salafiyya. In fact, the word of salafiyya, which Ibn Taymiyya has rarely included, has been placed in some places in a way that refers to the meaning field of the word salaf. When we consider the use of the word salaf in the works of Ibn Taymiyya, we first see the generations who lived in the early historical periods of Islamic thought and the conception of religion which these generations have revealed. Other names that have taken place in the history of Islamic thought have similar opinions about the generation of the predecessors and the religious understanding of this generation. In other words, according to the general opinion of the predecessor, especially the first three centuries came to mind. However, it is seen that Ibn Taymiyya made some attempts to periodize both the generation of the predecessors and to define the understanding of religion of this generation. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyya could not provide a clear picture on this issue, and he occasionally contradicted his findings regarding his involvement in the predecessor generation. Nevertheless, he generally adopted generalizations and an attitude to limit the meaning of the predecessor to the first generations. The word salafiyya, which Ibn Taymiyya placed on the meaning of the word salaf, is used less compared to the word salaf and is given in more complete terms. This indicates that the main factor that influenced Ibn Taymiyya's salafi thought was salaf, not salafiyya as a systematic structure. These findings make it necessary to reconsider the claims of Salafism being a sect and it is being represented at the time of Ibn Taymiyya. (shrink)

1. Sŏron -- 2. Ŭisik ŭi chonggyojŏk ch'ŭngmyŏn -- 3. Yŏng : Chŏng Yag-yong ŭi simnon -- 4. Yŏngch'e : Chŏng Yag-yong ŭi insŏngnon -- 5. 'Yŏngch'e' insŏngnon esŏ pon ch'ŏnin kwan'gye -- 6. Kyŏllon.

Abstract.In recent issues of Zygon, numerous reflections have been published commenting on where the field of science‐and‐religion has been, where it presently stands, and where it should move in the future. These reflections touch on the importance of the dialogue and raise questions as to what audience the dialogue addresses and whom it should address. Some scholars see the dialogue as prospering, while others point out that much work needs to be done to make the dialogue more accessible to a (...) larger audience and more successful at tackling the provocative questions before us. Other academics view the questions themselves as needing further consideration and focus before answers to them can even be explored. In this article I provide a general overview of these essays by outlining some general categories of thought that seem to emerge from the contributors. I then present some of my own opinions concerning the future of the science‐religion field and emphasize that the dialogue, in addition to its traditional roles, must further the philosophical framework that can aid humanity in resolving the most pressing global concerns of our time. (shrink)

We show that the variety of n -dimensional weakly higher order cylindric algebras, introduced in Németi [9], [8], is finitely axiomatizable when n > 2. Our result implies that in certain non-well-founded set theories the finitization problem of algebraic logic admits a positive solution; and it shows that this variety is a good candidate for being the cylindric algebra theoretic counterpart of Tarski’s quasi-projective relation algebras.

In our discussion on the development of political consciousness in the Chinese people in the past one hundred years, we will focus on the upward development made in the course of the reconstruction of the nation. If we simply study the historical facts, the past one hundred years are tragic. But if we study the spirit of the people during this period, we cannot but recognize that the Chinese people have never given up and that they have been constantly struggling (...) upward. In the history of their struggle the Chinese people have gone astray many times; otherwise, the country would not be what she is now. But from mistakes corrections are made, thus eliminating the possibility of repeating the same mistakes. This is what we call the instructional value of history. From this view, the Chinese people are presently undergoing a crisis in which they seem to have nothing to support and nothing to possess. But spiritually and ideologically, the Chinese people possess the most substantial "have," one that no other people or nation of the world has had. This most substantial "have" is the historical experience gained through the continuous upward struggle against failures in the reconstruction of their nation. This historical experience can be valuable only when it has become the self-consciousness of the people and their future generations. This self-consciousness is related mainly to the development of political consciousness in the Chinese people in the past hundred years. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Towards a PL-Metaphysics of Perception: In Search of the Metaphysical Roots of Constructivism” by Konrad Werner. Upshot: In his target article, Werner proposes a metaphysical foundation for a radical constructivist epistemology that is nonetheless claimed to reconcile constructivism with some sort of realism. While acknowledging his success in demonstrating that constructivism without an external/internal dualism is suitable for his purposes, I shall argue that rejecting a distinction between epistemological and ontological issues makes it questionable (...) whether PL-metaphysics can make constructivism compatible with realism. (shrink)

Human rights and civil rights, Interpretations and construction of Law and ethics, Iran.